Confidential Enterprise
Internal Network & Active Directory Adversarial Simulation
Sanitized case study — client details withheld for confidentiality.
Attack path demonstrated.
The ask.
A large enterprise wanted to know one thing concretely: if an attacker got a single foothold inside the network — through phishing, a compromised laptop, whatever — how far could they realistically get before anyone noticed? This was a full-cycle adversarial simulation, not a checklist audit.
Approach.
Starting from an assumed-breach foothold (a standard-privilege domain-joined workstation, mirroring a realistic phishing outcome), we ran a full internal kill chain:
Internal enumeration
LDAP/AD reconnaissance (BloodHound-driven attack path mapping), SMB share enumeration, and identification of misconfigured GPOs and service accounts.
Privilege escalation
Kerberoasting against service accounts with weak passwords, abuse of excessive delegation rights, and exploitation of a misconfigured ACL granting write access to a privileged group.
Lateral movement
Credential reuse across the environment via pass-the-hash, culminating in a path to full domain compromise through a chain of low-severity misconfigurations that, individually, no one had flagged as urgent.
What we found.
No single "smoking gun" vulnerability — this engagement’s value was demonstrating a complete attack chain: initial foothold → Kerberoastable service account with a crackable password → delegation abuse → domain admin, all without triggering the client’s existing detection tooling. We documented each link in the chain, including the exact misconfigurations that made each step possible.
Why it mattered.
This is the difference between "we passed our vulnerability scan" and "we know what actually happens when someone gets in." The client’s security team had strong perimeter controls but limited internal segmentation and detection — a common and dangerous gap, since most real-world breaches start with exactly this kind of foothold.
Outcome.
We worked directly with the client’s blue team to break every link in the chain — tightening delegation rights, rotating and hardening service account credentials, and tuning detection rules against the exact TTPs we used. A joint tabletop walkthrough of the attack path became part of their incident response training.
Similar exposure in your environment?
This engagement began with a conversation about scope. Start yours the same way.